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Preemption: The Federal Employees Health Benefit Act
(FEHBA): Why the Oklahoma Supreme Court Was
Wrong in Allowing State Claims in Kincade v. Group
Health Services
L Introduction
Federal law is the supreme law of the land and when in conflict with state law,
federal authority should supersede state law.' Whether a federal statute preempts a
particular or all state claim(s) requires inquiry into the congressional intent behind
passing the law. Congressional purpose is the "ultimate touchstone."3 Sometimes
the courts, however, cannot agree on the issue of congressional intent.4 Conse-
quently, courts occasionally reach different conclusions concerning whether a federal
statute preempts a state claim.5 The problem of defining the scope and extent of
federal preemption is extremely prevalent in claims based on the Federal Employees
Health Benefit Act (FEHBA).6
The FEHBA establishes a system for the federal government to "procure contracts
with medical service providers whereby federal employees can choose a particular
provider's plan as part of the employee's benefit package."7 Under the FEHBA
system, the individual employee and the federal government share the cost of the
medical insurance! In applying FEHBA, a majority of federal courts find that
FEHBA preempts state law claims.9 However, one federal court seems to have
determined that state claims are not preempted by FEHBA (despite concluding
federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear this "private controversy"),' and another
circuit court has decided the issue is one to be settled solely in state courts due to the
"lack of a federal statutory cause of action vindicating the same interests as the
insured's state" claim." The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has relied on these two
minority decisions and simply stated that FEHBA does not preempt state claims. 2
1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985).
3. Id.
4. See Kincade v. Group Health Servs., 945 P.2d 485, 489 (Okla. 1997).
5. See id.
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
7. Roux v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (D.N.M. 1996).
8. See id.
9. See generally Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993); Burkey v.
Government Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos.,
992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Nessein v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993);
Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 819 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1987); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
Department of Banking, 791 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1986).
10. See Howard v. Group Hosp. Serv., 739 F.2d 1508, 1510-12 (10th Cir. 1984).
11. Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 315 (3rd Cir. 1994).
12. See Kincade v. Group Health Servs., 945 P.2d 485, 489 (Okla. 1997).
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Kincade v. Group Health Services3 held that
a plaintiff could recover through a state claim under FEHBA for a carrier's refusal
to pay a valid insurnce claim." The court stated that it was following precedents
set down by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Third Circuits."5
However, a more recent opinion by a district court for the Eighth Circuit rejected the
rationale used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit." The
reasoning used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit may too
be disregarded.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma's decision in Kincade, while supported by case
law, is in error. Congress intended FEHBA to preempt state claims that were
inconsistent with FEHBA's goals. 7 The controversy surrounding FEHBA focuses
on what claims.courts have deemed inconsistent with FEHBA's objectives. The
majority of courts have, for the most part, decided that all state claims are
incompatible with EEHBA and are thus preempted by the Act." Hence, these courts
find most (if not all) state claims are "inconsistent with such contractual
provisions."'" Courts in the minority seem to indicate few state claims would be
contradictory to FE-IBA and conclude a plaintiff can probably maintain his suit,
albeit in state court."
Clearly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma's holding in Kincade is inconsistent with
past United States Supreme Court opinions regarding similar preemption issues in
relation to health care benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)' The
language in ERISA is very similar to the language used in FEHBA."
When one considers the divergent views taken by the courts on this question, it
becomes quite clear that the United States Supreme Court should rule on this issue,
13. 945 P.2d 485 (Cikla. 1997).
14. See id at 489.
15. See id
16. See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
17. See S. REP. No. 95-903, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1413; see discussion
infra Part II.
18. See, e.g,, Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993); Burkey v.
Government Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos.,
992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Nesseirn v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993);
Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 819 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1987); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
Department of Banking, 791 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1986).
19. S. REP. No. 95-903, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1413.
20. See Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 315 (3rd Cir. 1994); Howard
v. Group Hosp. Serv., 739 F.2d 1508, 1510-12 (10th Cir. 1984); Kincade v. Group Health Servs., 945
P.2d 485 (Okla. 1997).
21. See Allis-Chalmr.rs Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,218-19 (1985) (holding a state law claim for
bad faith handling of an insurance claim is preempted by federal labor-contract law); Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (concluding state law claims for breach of contract and tort in
relation to improper prooessing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan are preempted by
federal law); see discussion infra Part IV.C-D.
22. See Hanson, 9531 F. Supp. at 274.




Yet, despite recent efforts to bring the conflict to an end, the controversy surrounding
FEHBA still remains. On March 29, 1995, the Office of Personnel Management of
the United States of America (OPM) stated that FEHBA plans are "federal contracts"
and that "legal actions concerning disputes arising or relating to those contracts are
controlled by federal, rather than state law."u Thus, "Congress recognized that
allowing state courts to adjudicate FEHBA benefit claims would undercut the
consistency that it intended when it established FEHBA'' and changed the civil
enforcement provisions, making FEHBA claims the sole province of federal courts.
This note will outline five reasons why the conclusion reached by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma in Kincade should not be followed. First, the court ignored the
congressional intent argument calling for preemption (or in the alternative the
presence of a uniquely federal interest requiring application of federal common
law).27 Second, the court completely disregarded the similarity in language between
ERISA and FEHBA. This nearly identical language is important because the United
States Supreme Court said that ERISA preempts state claims. Third, the court
failed to recognize the changes made by the OPM on March 29, 1995.' Fourth, the
reasoning applied by the court in Kincade misconstrued the holdings and rationale
of the two cases upon which the court based its decision. 0 Finally, the court
neglected to force the plaintiff to exercise all of his administrative remedies as
required by the OPM before allowing the claim to be heard.3 Consequently, had the
court followed the appropriate procedural requirements of the OPM, the plaintiff
would not have been allowed to recover. Therefore, the decision reached by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma is erroneous and should not become majority law.
I. FEHBA Background and Prior Case Law History
FEHBA, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914, is the federal statute that governs
health benefits for federal employees 2 FEHBA provides that the United States,
"through the OPM, contracts with various private carriers to develop health care plans
but subsequently dismissing case in 514 U.S. 1048 (1995) because it was settled).
24. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,037 (1995) (to be codified at 5
C.F.R. pt. 890),
25. Hanson, 953 F. Supp. at 274.
26. See id.
27. See Burkey v. Government Employees Hosp. As'n, 983 F.2d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1993); Hayes
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 819 F.2d 921, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1987).
28. See Shaw v. Delta Air Unes, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91, 97 (1983) (holding ERISA preempts "any
and all state law insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... if it has
connection or reference to the plan").
29. See Hanson, 953 F. Supp. at 275 n.4.
30. See id.
31. See Nessein v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 1993) ("No action at
law or equity shall be brought to recover on a claim for benefits under the Plan until the administrative
remedy provided at Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 890.105 has been exhausted.")
(alteration in original).
32. See Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 819 F,2d 921, 922 (9th Cir. 1985).
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with varying coverages and costs. ''33 The plans run for one year and are annually
renegotiated.' Almost nine million federal employees and their dependents are
covered by the 300 health benefit plans procured by the OPM under FEHBA'
Under these plans, the federal government will pay no more than seventy-five percent
of the premiums, an expenditure of nearly eleven billion dollars annually.'
Federal employees covered by this plan enroll in the Service Benefit Plan pursuant
to FEHBA and the OPM regulations.37 An employee selects the benefits for each
FEHBA plan for the year. The OPM then provides a "detailed statement of benefits"
for enrollees, setting: forth the plan's benefits that the OPM "considers necessary or
desirable.
3
Enrollees must initially submit all claims to the health benefit carrier in which they
are enrolled.39 The enrollees have the right to request reconsideration when they
object to the plan's decision denying payment.' When the OPM concludes that the
carrier's denial of benefits is correct, a problem for the enrollees and needless
controversy for the courts emerges.
The FEHBA provides:
The provisions of any contract under this chapter which relate to the
nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect
to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any State or local law, or any
regulation issued thereunder, which relates to health insurance or plans
to the extent that such law or regulation is inconsistent with such
contractual provisions'
A claim "relates to" the plan under 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) as long as it has a
connection with or ifers to the plan' The Civil Service Commission also agrees
that FEHBA preempts conflicting state law 3
Prior to March 29, 1995, an enrollee was required to sue the carrier for problems
arising from the denial of health benefits."" However, the regulations have since
33. Id.
34. See id
35. See S. REP. No. 95-903, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S,C.C.A.N. 1413. 1413; see also
Kincade v. Group Health Servs., No. 87-302, slip op. at 4 (Okla. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1996).
36. See 5 U.S.C. § E.906(b)(2) (1994); Kincade, No. 87-302, slip op. at 4.
37. See id § 8905.
38. kd § 8902(d).
39. See 5 C.F.R. § 890.105(a)(1) (1996).
40. See id
41. 5 U.S.C. § 8902{m)(1) (1994),
42. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Department of Banking, 791 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11 th Cir.
1986).
43. See Kincade v. Group Health Servs., 945 P.2d 485, 488 (Okla. 1997); see S. REP. No. 95-903,
at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1415 (stating "while the FEHB[AI law gives the Civil Service
Commission sole authority to negotiate contracts with participating carriers and to prescribe regulations
to implement that law, the law does not give the Commission clear authority to issue regulations
restraining the application of State laws when their provisions do not parallel the provisions in the
Commission's health benefits contracts").




changed and enrollees now sue the OPM directly when challenging an adverse
decision concerning FEHBA benefits4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union'e held that in order
for federal law to completely preempt state claims, the statute relied upon by the
defendant must contain civil enforcement provisions' This requirement was
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court.!8
The second prerequisite identified by the United States Supreme Court before a
federal law can preempt state law is "a clear indication of Congressional intention to
permit removal despite the plaintiffs exclusive reliance on state law."'9 In 1978,
Congress enacted 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) in response to concern that the application
of inconsistent state law would result in an increase in premium costs to both the
government and federal employees." Furthermore, Congress feared that a lack of
uniformity of benefits would result in participants in some states paying a premium
based, at least in part, on the cost of benefits provided only to participants in other
states.' The Civil Service Commission recommended the adoption of subsection
(m) for the same reasons!O
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit indicated that FEHBA
did not preempt state claims, but ruled that federal courts exercised no jurisdiction
on the matter." Despite the changes made in March 1995 by the OPM, other courts
in the Tenth Circuit have adhered to this appellate decision and claim that the Tenth
Circuit's position on the issue has not been invalidated.'
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was presented with a controversy that
need not exisL If the Supreme Court of Oklahoma followed the Tenth Circuit's
analysis, then Kincade's claim could not only be heard, but had already been
determined not to be preempted by federal law.' Certainly, the court was not
obligated to follow the Tenth Circuit's opinion because state courts clearly have
independent jurisdiction to interpret federal law. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
had the option to follow the great weight of authority by holding that the claim was
barred either because it was preempted, or because the matter had become one of
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
45. See id.
46. 36 F.3d 306 (3rd Cir. 1994).
47. See Goepel, 36 F.3d at 311.
48. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24, 26 (1983).
49. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1987).
50. See S. REP. No. 95-903, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1413, 1415.
51. See id,
52. See Kincade v. Group Health Servs.. 945 P.2d 485, 488 (Okla. 1997).
53. See Howard v. Group Hosp. Serv., 739 F.2d 1508, 1510-12 (10th Cir. 1984).
54. See Roux v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (D.N.M. 1996) (noting the
critical provisions discussed in Howard as to not granting federal question jurisdiction have not been
amended).
55. See Howard, 739 F.2d at 1510-12.
56. See Wilson v. Harlow, 860 P.2d 793, 798-99 (Okla. 1993).
57. See generally Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993); Burkey v.
Government Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos.,
1999]
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111. Kincade v. Group Health Services
Appellants sued Group Health Services of Oklahoma, d/b/a/ Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, for bad faith refusal to pay a valid claim and for tortious interference with a
physician-patient relationship." Kincade, a minor child, suffered from a compulsive
disorder and tried to end his own life due to his parents' divorce. 9 A physician
recommended that the child be treated through in-patient care.'M The coverage and
benefits of Kincade's federal health insurance plan were contracted between the OPM
and Blue Cross and Blue Shield and selected by his father, pursuant to FE-BA.6"
Blue Cross and Blue Shield declined to pay for in-patient care and defended the
action brought by Kincade in the District Court of Oklahoma by declaring FEHBA,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1), preempted state claims!' The District Court
agreed with Blue Cross and Blue Shield dismissing the claim and the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals affirmed.' Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted
certiorari.L "
Kincade presented the Supreme Court of Oklahoma with the question of whether
FEHBA, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1), preempted state causes of action.' The
court determined preemption of state claims was not a "clear and manifest purpose
of Congress" in enacting 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1)." The court further noted that it
found "nothing in the language of the preemption statute, nor its most recent
legislative history, that reveals any intent to preempt state law causes of action that
may arise in the performance of a health insurance plan contracted under the
FEHBA. '5 The court followed two minority decisions on the issue." One of the
decisions followed by the court held that FEHBA preemption was an issue to be
settled solely by state courts.' The other decision followed, a Tenth Circuit case,
held that a suit concerning FEHBA did not afford federal courts jurisdiction over the
issue, but went on to suggest that state claims were not preempted.e Although a
majority of courts have held otherwise, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma was not
persuaded that the congressional intent of 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) or the recent
992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1993);
Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 819 F.2d 921 (9th Cir, 1987); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
Department of Banking, 791 F.2d 1501 (11 th Cir. 1986); Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F.
Supp. 270 (N.D. Iowa I96).





63. See id. at 486-87.
64. See id. at 487.
65. See id
66. Id. at 489,
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306. 312 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1994).




changes made by the OPM to the civil enforcement procedures preempted state
causes of action." In passing, the court did mention that six of the federal circuit
courts of appeals have ruled that state claims are preempted.' However, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma failed to mention that a majority of state courts that
have addressed the issue also concluded that state claims are preempted." Finally,
the court observed that state remedies may coexist with a scheme of federal
remedies.74
The decision reached by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma further complicates the
preemption issue surrounding FEHBA. Absent a United States Supreme Court ruling,
the conflict will likely continue to exist. Even an amendment to FEHBA by the
OPM, which requires claimants to sue the OPM directly and not the individual
carrier, was not dispositive on the issue for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. 5
Initially, the court should have recognized that congressional intent should be
conclusive on the issue, resulting in preemption of Kincade's claim (or could have
displaced state law with federal common law because a significant conflict existed
between the two).7 Second, the court failed to compare the similarities between
ERISA and FEHBA. ERISA preempts state claims and illustrates by analogy that
FEHBA suits should not be heard by state courts." Likewise, the court should not
have ignored the changes made by the OPM on March 29, 1995." Finally, the court
should have more closely analyzed the holdings and rationale of the two cases in
which it based its decision.' Furthermore, regardless of the questions surrounding
preemption, the court should have required the plaintiff to exercise all of his
administrative remedies before bringing action?
71. See Kincade, 945 P.2d at 489-92.
72. See id. at 489 n.20.
73. See generally Barr v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 174 (Ark. 1988);
Hartenstine v. Blue Cross, 241 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Buatte v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc.,
939 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Nitschke v. Blue Cross, 751 P.2d 175 (Mont. 1988); Aybar v.
New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 701 A.2d 932 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Fink v.
Delaware Valley HMO, 612 A.2d 485 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
74. See Dority v. Green County Casting Corp., 727 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Okla. 1986).
75. See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
76. See Burkey v. Government Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1995); Hayes
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 819 F.2d 921, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1987); S. REP. No. 95-903, at 4 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1413, 1415; see supra text accompanying notes 27, 50.
77. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (holding ERISA preempts "any and all
state law insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... if it has
connection or reference to the plan").
78. See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
79. See Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 315 (3rd Cir. 1994); Howard
v. Group Hosp. Serv., 739 F.2d 1508, 1510-12 (10th Cir. 1984).
80. See Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804. 807 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding no
action at law or equity shall be brought to recover a claim for benefits until administrative remedies have
been exhausted).
19991
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IV. Analysis
A. Congress Intended to Preempt State Claims Concerning FEHBA
The United States Congress had one overall objective in mind in enacting the
preemption clause of FEHIBA. That goal was to provide uniform benefits to federal
employees, regardless of their location in the United States, in order to assist in
containing the costs of providing those benefits." The limitation language "to the
extent that such law or regulation is inconsistent with such contractual provisions"
was added to the preemption clause for two stated purposes.' First, the clause
recognizes the rights of states to determine who is to provide health services.
Second, the clause guarantees that insurance carriers under the program are not
granted exemptions from state laws and regulations governing other aspects of the
insurance business, including the payment of premium taxes and the requirement for
statutory reserves."
Several federal circuit courts of appeals have stated that congressional intent is of
primary importance when courts are determining if FEHBA preempts state tort
claims' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
policy underlying the preemption clause of 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) is to insure
uniformity of the administration of FEHBA benefits.' Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has found that Congress did not intend tort claims to be held
separable from the terms of the contract.' When courts hold otherwise, state law
is used to expand the benefit provider's obligations under the terms of the plan. "
The courts are then creating requirements that are inconsistent with the plan and
clearly conflicting with the express language of 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1)." Thus,
Kincade's state tort claims should have been barred.
In a case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,9 the court
rejected an argument that a distinction can be made between a plaintiff seeking
remedies and a claim relating to the "nature or extent of coverage of benefits."'"
The court stated no such difference can be reasonably recognized.' Such claims
"relate to" the plan under 5 U.SC. § 8902(m)(1) provided they have a connection
with or refer to thte plan." The statements by the House Committee report on the
81. See S. REP. No. 95-903, at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N, at 1417.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) (1994).
83. See S. REP. No. 95-903, at 4. reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1416.
84. See id., reprin'ed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1415.
85. See generally Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74, 79 (4th Cir. 1993); Burkey v.
Government Employees Hsp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1993); Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
819 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1987).
86. See Hayes, 819 F.2d at 925.
87. See id. at 926 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213-20 (1985)),
88. See Hayes, 819 F,2d at 926.
89. See id.
90. See Burkey v. Government Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 660.
92. See id,




future 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m) entitled "Preemption of State Laws Inconsistent with
Federal Employee Health Benefits Program,"" and the official statements by the
Civil Service Commission and the White House "suggest an intent to preempt any
inconsistent state law no matter how tenuous its relation to insurance."' Kincade's
claims definitely "related to" the plan, and under this analysis the claimant should not
have been allowed to recover. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits have essentially determined that any claim in reference to the contract
is "inconsistent" with goals of FEHBA and is therefore preempted.' 7 However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has found federal common law
displaces state law without determining whether FEHBA completely preempts state
law claims.
B. Creation of Federal Common Law to Displace State Law
Even when a court decides that Congress has failed to show sufficient intent to
preempt state law, a court may, by utilizing a two-part test, find that federal common
law still governs a dispute' First, the claim must involve a uniquely federal
interest." A significant interest exists if the dispute "touch[es] the rights and duties
of the United States.""' The claim may involve private parties and federal common
law may still apply.' Kincade's interest is uniquely federal because it involves
health benefits that are available to federal employees across the country. Imposition
of state law liability in Kincade's case would "seriously damage not only the
government's ability to enter into contracts with health insurers, but also would affect
the price paid for such contacts.""'2 It is important to note that because the federal
government is a party to the contract,"' there is a significant federal interest in the
outcome of Kincade's litigation. For a court to apply federal common law, however,
the second part of the test must also be met."e
In addition to a federal interest, .'a significant conflict' must exist between the
federal interest or policy and the effect of the state law, 'or the application of the
state law must frustrate specific policy objectives of the federal legislation.""
' 5
Application of fifty different states' laws to claims arising under FEHBA would
entirely defeat the purpose of the OPM review.'" Kincade could be entitled to
1986).
94. H.R. REP. No. 95-282, at 3-5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1413-16.
95. See id. at 6-8, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1417-20.
96. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Inc., 791 F.2d at 1505 (emphasis added).
97. See infra notes 111, 115 and accompanying text.
98. See Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74, 78 (4th Cir. 1993).
99. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1987).
100. Id. at 506 (quoting Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33
(1956)).
101. See id. at 507.
102. Caudill, 999 F.2d at 78.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. Id. (alteration in original).
106, See id. at 79.
1999]
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benefits not provided to many other federal employees in different states because of
the vast difference in the common law from state to state. Furthermore, enrollees in
some states would pay higher premiums to cover services provided only to Kincade
in his state. For instance, if Kincade is allowed to recover for services that were
required to be provided in Oklahoma (if the court so determines), but are in fact
furnished in no other state, then individuals in other states will be forced to finance
services they do not receive. Such an allowance would fly in the face of FEHBA's
purpose. Finally, allowing state courts to adjudicate state claims would "undercut the
consistency Congi:ess intended when it provided the OPM review process.""
Therefore, as other courts have held in the area of federal employee health benefits,
federal common law should have entirely replaced Oklahoma state law."r
It is clear, regardless of whether a court determines Congress has expressly
manifested the requisite intent to preempt a state claim, that either displacement or
preemption of state law claims is the only means to properly achieve the goals of
uniformity of benefits and cost containment Congress had in mind when passing
FEHBA. Therefore, in order to appropriately serve congressional ends, Kincade's
state claims should have been preempted or replaced, and federal common law should
have governed because a uniquely federal interest and significant conflict were
present.
C. Similarity Between ERISA and FEHBA
If one were to examine the language used in ERISA and FEHBA, it is apparent
the statutes closely resemble one another. The United States Supreme Court held that
state law claims for breach of contract and tort concerning the improper processing
of a claim for benefits under an ERISA regulated plan are preempted by federal
law." The Court stated that "[there is no dispute that the common law causes of
action asserted in . . . the complaint 'relate to' an employee benefit plan and
therefore fall under ERISA's express preemption clause.""' Some courts have
observed that the language in ERISA is very comparable to the words used in
FEHBA."' The pertinent part of ERISA's preemption clause provides that "the
provisions of this Subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . ." FEHBA's
preemption clause, as stated earlier, states, "The provisions of any contract which
relate to the nature or extent of coverage shall supersede or preempt any State or




109. See Pilot Life. Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).
110. Id.
111. See Burkey v. Government Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656,660 (5th Cir. 1993); Hanson
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 274 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).




In reaching its decision that state claims concerning FEHBA were prohibited, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially relied on the similarity
between ERISA's preemption clause and FEHBA."4 The court pointed out that the
United States Supreme Court has held that state claims are preempted under ERISA
despite a savings clause."' The clause reads in part, "Nothing in this subchapter
shall be constructed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any state which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.""6 Furthermore, the court determined
that FEHBA has no such clause."' The relevance of this point cannot be
understated. FEHBA preempts any inconsistent state law that relates to the health
benefit plan and makes no allowance to save certain state laws. If Kincade's state
claims expand the provider's obligations under the plan, then the claims would relate
to and be inconsistent with the contractual provisions, Therefore, such claims would
be preempted and incapable of being saved under FEHBA.
Although the United States Supreme Court has noted that some state laws "may
affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to
warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan,""... no such argument is
applicable in Kincade. If the statement of benefits, which is incorporated as part of
the insurance contract, is construed together with 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m), the same result
as that of ERISA's preemption clause is reached."' The statement of benefits
expressly provides that "federal law exclusively governs all claims of relief in a
lawsuit that relate to Service Benefit Plan benefits or coverage or payments with
respect to those benefits."'" Such a tenuous relationship cannot be found in
Kincade when one considers, as previously stated, the United States Supreme Court
has refused to allow the same type of claims in regards to other health benefit
plans.'
There are other provisions found in ERISA that are also now present in FEHBA,
indicating that additional grounds exist for finding FEHBA preempts state claims.'"
These provisions will be addressed under the next section, which concerns the
changes made by the OPM on March 29, 1995.
114. See Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 819 F.2d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 1987).
115. See id.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
117. See id.
118. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
119. See Kincade v. Group Health Servs., No. 87-302, slip op. at 19 (Okla. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1996).
120. ld.
121. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (concluding state law claims for
breach of contract and tort in relation to improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-
regulated plan are preempted by federal law); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218-19
(1985) (holding a state law claim for bad faith handling of an insurance claim is preempted by federal
labor-contract law); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
122. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987) (extending the complete
preemption doctrine to an action arising under ERISA because "ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
closely parallels that of § 301 of the LMRA").
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
D. The OPM's Clunges Should Have Resulted In Complete Preemption
The United States Supreme Court has found complete preemption of state claims
in two areas that specifically relate to FEHBA." These cases, calling for complete
preemption, involve ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, and section 301 of the LMRA,
29 U.S.C. § 185.2
There are two ways in which a federal court can confer jurisdiction over a
particular claim: diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. The well plead
complaint rule stat-.s that federal question jurisdiction is present only when a federal
question appears on the face of the plaintiffs complaint.u There is, however, an
exception to this rule. The complete preemption doctrine "prohibits a plaintiff from
defeating removal by failing to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint and
allows a defense of federal preemption as a basis of removal."'" Many of the cases
surrounding FEHBA were tried in federal courts because the suits were transferred
from state courts.' Prior to the OPM changes on March 29, 1995, an enrollee sued
the carrier, not th- OPM. A jurisdictional problem existed in the sense that the
dispute seemed to be between nondiverse private parties involving state claims, and
consequently, there was no federal question jurisdiction. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit hurdled this obstacle by using another test enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court (matter at issue governed by federal common
law) and thus did not answer the question of whether all state claims are preempted
under FEHBA." Other federal courts seem to have avoided the issue and simply
assumed jurisdiction. "' Nevertheless, the problems concerning federal jurisdiction
are no longer present because the OPM has changed the procedures for filing suit."3
The complete preemption doctrine represents an exception to the well plead
complaint rule, and as analysis will show, the test is satisfied to preempt state claims
relating to FEHBA.
When determining if the complete preemption doctrine allows a case to properly
be removed from state to federal court, the United States Supreme Court has
established a two-part test.' First, a court must determine whether FEHBA
completely preempts the field of benefits claim under the Service Benefit Plan.'
Second, the court must decide if the plaintiffs claim falls within the civil enfor-
cement provisions of FEHBA.'33
123. See The Queen v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 1989).
124. See id
125. See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 273 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
126. ld
127. See Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 316 n.13 (3rd Cir. 1994).
128. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1987); Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
129. See Goepel, 36 F.2d at 316 n.13.
130. See Hanson, 953 F. Supp. at 275 n.4.
131. See Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 543 (8th Cir. 1996).
132. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1987).




The United States Supreme Court, in determining if Congress intended ERISA to
preempt state claims, looked to whether there was a clear indication by Congress to
permit removal despite plaintiffs reliance on state law and the civil enforcement
provisions of the Act." Section 1132(a) of ERISA calls for a participant or
beneficiary to file a civil action to recover benefits under an ERISA plan.13 An
ERISA provision also calls for "district courts of the United States to have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions."'" Combining these two provisions creates an exclusive
federal cause of action vindicating a beneficiary's interest in recovering his or her
benefits under a plan." 7 A very similar result is reached when FEHBA's civil
enforcement provisions are combined."
On March 29, 1995, the OPM promulgated a restriction requiring enrollees to sue
the OPM directly when challenging an adverse decision relating to FEHBA
benefits." Akin to ERISA, FEHBA empowers an individual to bring suit against
the OPM to review a denial of health benefits under the plan." Furthermore, the
jurisdictional provision of FEHBA, like ERISA, provides that "the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction... of a civil action or claim against the
United States."'' Congress specifically made no allowance for state courts to
adjudicate FEHBA claims for fear that state courts would undercut the consistency
that was intended by the Act." Comparing the two acts, it is clear that the
combination of the civil enforcement and jurisdictional provisions creates an
exclusive federal claim under both acts."
In Kincade, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma chose to ignore the changes made by
the OPM." It is undisputed that Kincade's claim was filed on February 5, 1995,
and the changes made by the OPM did not occur until March 29, 1995."'
However, jurisdictional provisions, such as the new OPM regulations, are procedural
and these provisions apply to pending cases."' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma stated that the changes did not affect the reasoning it used to reach its
decision.'47 The court also found that another court" came to the same
conclusion." Regardless of the rationale used by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
in its opinion, changes have been made by the OPM to FEHBA that are completely
134. See Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64-66.
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
136. Id. § 1132(e)(1).
137. See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 274 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
138. See id
139. See iL at 275 n.4.
140. See id. at 274.
141. 5 U.S.C. § 8912 (1994).
142. See S. REP. No. 95-903, at 2-4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1413-15.
143. See Hanson, 953 F. Supp. at 275.
144. See Kincade v. Group Health Servs., 945 P.2d 485, 491-92 (Okla. 1997).
145. See Brief for Appellee at 3-4, Kincade v. Group Health Servs., 945 P.2d 485 (Okla. 1997) (No.
87-302).
146. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994).
147. See Kincade, 945 P.2d at 491-92.
148. See id (citing Roux v. Lovelace Health Sys., 947 F. Supp. 1534, 1541, n.6 (D.N.M. 1996)).
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consistent with similar provisions in ERISA. And as stated previously, the United
States Supreme Court has determined that ERISA claims are within the exclusive
province of federal courts and state claims are preempted.' Therefore, FEHBA
suits, like the one brought in Kincade, should be heard only by federal courts. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma should never have heard the case.
E. Misconstruing Prior Precedent
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma relied primarily on two cases in reaching its
decision."5° These cases are Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers' and
Howard v. Group Hospital Service."s The Supreme Court of Oklahoma simply
misconstrued the rationale used by the Goepel court. The reasoning used in Howard
will be shown to be unsound.
The Goepel court prefaced its decision, which stated that claims arising under
FEHBA did not present federal jurisdiction,'" on the basis that FEHBA did not
contain the requisite civil enforcement provisions to allow for complete preemption
of state claims." The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
previously concluded that "state courts are competent to determine whether state law
has been preempted by federal law."'55 The civil enforcement provisions have since
been amended, and the changes made now call for the claimant to file an action
directly against the OPM and not the carrier." Therefore, a major premise on
which the Goepel court relied, ° and in turn the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
applied, is no longer applicable." The court misconstrued why the Goepel court
reached such a decision and by doing so allowed a needless controversy to continue
to exist.
In Howard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that it
failed "to see how various state court adjudications of [FEHBA] . .. benefits
claims... [would] frustrate the operation of that program or conflict with a specific
national policy."" This rationale is not sound when one examines the intent
Congress stated in passing FEHBA.I The Howard court said that a FEHBA
dispute is solely a private matter and that "the federal government simply does not
149. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987).
150. See Kincade, 945 P.2d at 489-91.
151. 36 F.2d 306 (3rd Cir. 1994).
152. 739 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1984).
153. See Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers, 36 F.3d 306, 316 (3rd Cir. 1994).
154. See'id at 311.
155. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936, 942 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
156. See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1996); 5 C..R.
§ 890.107(c) (1996).
157. See Goepel, 36 F.3d at 311.
158. See Kincade v. Group Health Servs., 945 P.2d 485, 489-91 (Okla, 1997).
159. Howard v. Group Hosp. Serv., 739 F.2d 1508, 1511 (10th Cir. 1984).
160. See S. REP. No. 95-903, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1413; supra note




have an interest sufficient to justify invoking federal question jurisdiction."'"' The
court declined to follow the principle that a claim can involve private parties and
federal common law may still apply.'" For a court to apply federal common law
and thus exercise federal question jurisdiction, the two-part test must be met."
Both a "uniquely federal interest" and "a significant conflict" must exist between the
federal interest or policy and the effect of the state law, "or the application of the
state law must frustrate specific policy objectives of the federal legislation."'" As
previously stated, the application of fifty different state laws would definitely frustrate
the purpose Congress had in mind when passing FEHBA. Even before the OPM
changes, the jurisdictional provision of FEHBA clearly provides federal courts with
jurisdiction over FEHBA claims." It is probably safe to assume Congress was not
attempting to unconstitutionally enlarge the federal district court's jurisdiction, but
rather intending that the courts either find a "uniquely federal interest" or completely
preempting state law claims. Furthermore, under careful examination of the
jurisdiction and civil enforcement provisions, it is clear now that a federal cause of
action is not only present, but that only federal jurisdiction exists.'" State courts
normally have independent jurisdiction to interpret federal law,' 7 but courts may
not have such freedom in cases concerning FEHBA.'"
A United States District Court opinion from New Mexico, also a court in the Tenth
Circuit, concluded that Howard was still good law.'" The district court stated that
the critical statutory provisions, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8902(m)(1) and 8912, had not been
changed.' Whether the "critical statutory provisions" relied upon in Howard had
changed is irrelevant; FEHBA actions are no longer "private controversies" because
plaintiffs must now file suit against the OPM. Thus, this change (requiring a plaintiff
to sue the OPM directly), along with the jurisdictional provisions, creates exclusive
federal question jurisdiction and prohibits the Supreme Court of Oklahoma from
hearing Kincade.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma should have followed the great weight of
decisions.' and held in Kincade that state claims were either preempted by federal
161. Howard, 739 F.2d at 1512.
162. See id. at 1512; see also Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74, 78-80 (4th Cir.
1993) (applying the uniquely federal interest and significant conflict test to displace state claims and
implement federal common law).
163. See Caudill, 999 F.2d at 78.
164. Ma
165. See 5 U.S.C. § 8912 (1994); see also Hartenstine v. Blue Cross, 241 Cal. Rptr. 756, 764-65
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987); supra note 141 and accompanying text.
166. See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
167. See Wilson v. Harlow, 860 P.2d 793, 798-99 (Okla. 1993).
168. See Hanson, 953 F. Supp. at 274.
169. See Roux v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 n.6 (D.N.M. 1996).
170. See id. at 1541.
171. See generally Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993); Burkey v.
Government Employees Hosp. Ass'n, 983 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos.,
992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993);
Hayes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 819 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1987); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
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law"7 or FEHBA suits had fallen into the exclusive province of federal courts."
Either way, a more just outcome would have been obtained and a needless
controversy would tie much closer to coming to an end.
F. Application of the. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
A court's examination of an administrative agency's decision is generally reviewed
under the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)."4 In
Kincade, the arbitra.y and capricious standard was never used because the plaintiff
failed to exhaust all of his administrative remedies as required before filing suit."'
Kincade did not apleal to the OPM as he was required to do under FEHBA after
Blue Cross and Blue Shield denied his claim 76 He simply filed suit,'" even
though "[a] covered individual must exhaust both the carrier and OPM review
processes ... befon seeking judicial review of the denied claim. ' 8 The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma chose not to address this issue.'" The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit said a claim for denial of benefits was not actionable
in courts until administrative remedies are first exhausted."w Accordingly, Kincade
could have been dismissed on other grounds.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma's decision in Kincade further muddles the
preemption question concerning FEHBA. An effort by the OPM, which requires a
plaintiff to file suit directly against the office, has not yet solved the problem."'
Despite the fact that the goals of Congress in passing FEHBA are undisputed, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma did not conclude that state claims were intended to be
preempted."s The congressional goals for the Act include providing uniform
benefits to all federal employees regardless of their location and avoiding the
application of inconsistent state laws in order to keep costs contained both for the
government and employees.'" By allowing Kincade's state claims to go forward,
Department of Banking, 791 F.2d 1501 (1lth Cir. 1986); Barr v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
Inc., 761 S.W.2d 174 (Ark. 1988); Hartenstine v. Blue Cross, 241 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987);
Nitschke v. Blue Cross, 751 P.2d 175 (Mont. 1988); Buatte v. Gencare Health Sys., Inc., 939 S.W.2d
440 (Mo. CL App. 1996]; Aybar v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 701 A.2d 932 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1997); Firk v. Delaware Valley HMO, 612 A.2d 485 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); supra notes
9, 73 and accompanying text.
172. See cases cited supra note 171.
173. See Hanson, 953 F. Supp. at 274.
174. See Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 806 (8th Cir. 1993).
175. See Kincade v. Group Health Servs., 945 P.2d 485, 486 (Okla. 1997).
176. See id
177. See id
178. 5 C.F.R. § 890.105(c) (1996).
179. See iL at 492.
180. See Nesseim rv. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 1993).
181 See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
182. See Kincade, 945 P.2d at 489.




the court frustrates these goals. While the best result would have been to find
Kincade's state claims preempted, the court could have instead applied federal
common law because of the presence of a uniquely federal interest and significant
conflict with state law. This result, while not entirely accurate, would have been
preferable to allowing Kincade's state claims.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma ignored the fact that the language in FEHBA
closely resembles the provisions in ERISA.', The United States Supreme Court has
held that suits filed in state court for breach of contract and tort relating to the
wrongful processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA regulated plan are
preempted by federal law.lu The Court stated the key question was whether the
claim "relates to" an employee benefit plan."s The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
should have used this same rationale to preempt Kincade's claims concerning
FEHBA.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma failed to recognize the changes
made by the OPM on March 29, 1995, which created exclusive federal jurisdiction
for FEHBA claims.' Likewise, the court misconstrued the holdings and rationale
of the two cases on which it based its decision. One of the decisions is no longer
valid due to the OPM amendment which added the civil enforcement provisions,"
the other decision can be dismissed because the great weight of authority and
evidence indicates state claims are preempted.'
Finally, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma chose not to dismiss Kincade's claims
despite the plaintiffs failure to follow administrative procedures." And as the Civil
Service Commission predicted, enforcement of this preemption policy has led to
time-consuming and costly litigation because the courts, as foreseen, have not
unanimously or immediately upheld the policy."' Yet, the need for uniformity of
benefits and efficient application outweigh the unnecessary litigation that unfor-
tunately and invariably will continue.'" For the reasons stated, the decision reached
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is erroneous.
Matthew P. Sallusti
50-51 and accompanying text.
184. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 91, 97 (1983) (holding ERISA preempts "any and
all state law insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... if it has
connection or reference to the plan").
185. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987).
186. See iL
187. See Hanson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 275 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
188. See Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 315 (3rd Cir. 1994); supra
note 11 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
190. See Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 1993) ("No action at
law or equity shall be brought to recover on a claim for benefits under the Plan until the administrative
remedy provide at Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 890.105 has been exhausted.")
(alteration in original); supra note 31 and accompanying text.
191. See S. REP. No. 95-903 at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1419.
192. See id.
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